Condemnation in Indiana: Discovery of Expert Appraisal Reports by unknown
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 2 Symposium on Federal Jurisdiction 
and Procedure 
pp.409-453 
Symposium on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 
Condemnation in Indiana: Discovery of Expert Appraisal Reports 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Condemnation in Indiana: Discovery of Expert Appraisal Reports, 8 Val. U. L. Rev. 409 (1974). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss2/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
CONDEMNATION IN INDIANA: DISCOVERY OF
EXPERT APPRAISAL REPORTS
INTRODUCTION
Some concern has been expressed over the extent to which
facts, opinions and conclusions ascertained by an expert who has
been hired by a litigant for consultation and testimony should be
subject to pretrial discovery.' Opponents of broad discovery argue
that litigation is primarily a contest between adversaries and an
"arms-length affair."2 Such discovery, it is alleged, would be an
unwarranted interference with a party's trial preparation.' Propo-
nents of broad discovery stress its importance in promoting a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of the case 4-important goals
in a day when the overcrowding of court dockets has become a major
problem. 5 Mutual knowledge of all relevant evidence before trial is
deemed essential in giving each party a complete and fair hearing
on the merits of the controversy.'
1. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REV. 455 (1962); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 38 F.R.D. Ill (1965) [hereihafter cited as Long]; Note, Pretrial Discovery in
Condemnation Proceedings: An Evaluation, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 52 (1967).
2. See Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 481, 484
(1968).
:3. See, e.g., Long, supra note 1, at 123.
4. Id. at 112. See also United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968):
Ilun condemnation cases full pretrial disclosure of appraisers' opinions and details
upon which they are based is required if the rules are to accomplish their purpose to
"make a trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."
Id. at 70 (footnotes omitted).
5. See Roe v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 28 Mich. App. 42, 184 N.W.2d 350 (1970):
It seems to us, having in mind the clogged dockets of our trial courts, that the
interest in shortening the interval between the commencement of an action and
adjudication requires not only that we allow litigants to require disclosure of the other
side's case in advance of trial, but further that in some cases it is the duty of the
trial court to insist that the parties employ these ancillary techniques in an effort to
expedite the trial process and to reduce the backlog.
Id. at 58. 184 N.W.2d at 356.
6. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947):
IThe deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.
No longer can the time honored cry of "fishing-expedition" serve to preclude a party
from inquiry into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that
end. either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession.
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This divergence of opinion over the scope of discovery is partic-
ularly acute in condemnation actions where the trial may depend
principally upon expert testimony, with opinions and underlying
factual data constituting a bulk of the evidence.7 These opinions
and factual data are often determinative of the amount of payment
to be made to the condemnee. In order to guarantee that adequate
compensation is afforded, procedures must be provided so that both
the landowner and condemnor are given every opportunity to estab-
lish the true value of the property being taken.' It is the contention
of this note that the opportunity can be most effectively given by
allowing discovery of expert opinions, conclusions and facts upon
which they are based as contained in appraisal reports compiled
prior to trial. This discovery would be accomplished by obtaining
the adverse party's appraisal report before trial and would be al-
lowed as long as it is known that the expert appraiser is going to
testify.
Courts have been hopelessly split over the allowance of such
discovery. Some decisions have prohibited discovery entirely9 while
others have allowed complete discovery.' 0 In compromising between
these extremes, a number of courts have differentiated between
facts upon which the opinions and conclusions of an expert are
based and the opinions and conclusions themselves, only the former
being discoverable."
Id. at 507 (footnotes omitted).
7. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
8. See Pinellas County v. Carlson, 242 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 1970).
9. See, e.g., United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark. 1962);
United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955); United States v. Certain
Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga. 1955); United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18
F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
10. See, e.g., United States v. 2,001.10 Acres of Land, 48 F.R.D. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1969);
United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land. 13 F.R.D_ 19 (F,.Tf.N V 1qr,9): Rwr~rtzmnn v. Supenr,
Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See also Pinellas County
v. Carlson, 242 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1970), where full discovery was permitted to the condemnee
yet was denied to the State unless the condemnee initiated such discovery.
11. See, e.g., United States v. 284,392 Sq. Ft. of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y.
1962); Calif'ornia v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261 (N.D. Cal. 1961); United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959). A common method of separating facts from
opinions in reports submitted by the experts is to order the reports to be inspected by the
court in camera. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal.
1953).
This fact-opinion distinction has been sharply criticized. See Friedenthal, Discovery and
Uses of Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 473 (1962); Long, supra
[Vol. 8
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In support of the contention that appraisal reports should be
subject to discovery, consideration will be given to the nature of
condemnation itself. The condemnation procedure and the inherent
difficulty of establishing the amount of compensation to be paid to
the condemnee will be noted in order to understand the value of
such discovery. The reasons for the denial of discovery will then be
discussed. Finally, consideration will be given to Trial Rule 26 of the
Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure which establishes a separate proce-
dure for discovery from experts. 2 Some lower courts in Indiana have
interpreted this rule to mean that appraisal reports prepared by
experts expected to be called as witnesses at trial are not discovera-
ble."1 A close scrutiny of the rule will show this interpretation to be
erroneous.
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Requirement of "Just Compensation"
The exercise of eminent domain transcends all rights in the free
use, enjoyment and disposal of property by the individual.' 4 It is not
dependent upon any specific constitutional grant. Rather, it has
been called inherent as a built-in attribute of sovereignty.' 5 To pre-
vent abuse and injustice which might result from its unrestricted
use, payment of just compensation to the landowner is required by
the United States Constitution" as well as the Constitution of
note 1, at 144-45. The distinction is without merit, according to these authors. Opinions of
an expert are actually facts in the case, with his conclusions constituting as much of the
evidence as his observations. For the purposes of this note, the decisions distinguishing
between fact and opinion are therefore included within the collection of cases denying discov-
ery.
12. IND. R. TR. P. 26(B)(3).
13. E.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, Cause No. 71-PSC-1161
(Porter Super. Ct., Sept. 14, 1973).
14. One court described the condemnee as a "victim" of "one of the most harsh proceed-
ings known to law." Pinellas County v. Carlson, 242 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 1970).
15. Board of Comm'rs v. Blue Ribbon Ice Cream & Milk Corp., 231 Ind. 436, 109 N.E.2d
88 (1952):
It is inaccurate to say, as it has sometimes been said in Indiana, that the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is "prescribed by the Constitution and regulated by
statute." The power is inherent in, and essential to, the existence of all government
even in its most primitive forms. It does not depend for its existence upon a specific
grant in the Constitution. It is a power which exists without constitutional recogni-
tion, a power which is limited, but not conferred, by constitutional provisions.
Id. at 439, 109 N.E.2d at 89.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
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Indiana." This requirement includes a guarantee to the landowner
of an opportunity to contest the necessity of the taking and the
amount of compensation to be awarded.'"
Just compensation must be payment of a full and perfect equiv-
alent in money for the property taken.'9 It is a reciprocal
requirement in that it must be fair to both the property owner and
the condemnor. 0 Indiana case law interprets just compensation as
putting the property owner in as good a pecuniary position as he
would have been in had his property not been taken.2 '
Judicial Procedure in Establishing Just Compensation
Indiana statutory law governs the procedure for determining
the necessity of the taking as well as the amount of compensation
to be paid for the taking.2 Any person, corporation, association or
agency with "clear legislative authority" to condemn is entitled to
invoke this procedure." If the provisions of the statute are followed,
no violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution or any Indiana constitutional pro-
vision exists.24
Before proceeding to condemn, the condemnor is required to
make an effort to purchase the land, right of way easement or other
property or right being sought. 25 This effort must be made in "good
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), where the Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment
as applying the limitation of "just compensation" under the fifth amendment to the states.
17. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
18. Slentz v. Fort Wayne, 233 Ind. 226, 231, 118 N.E.2d 484, 487 (1954).
19. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 204 Ind. 631, 636, 185 N.E. 449, 451 (1933). However, some
losses incurred due to the taking are not compensable. See note 96 inifra and accompanying
text.
22. !No. iuuc §§ 32-11-1-i io -13 (1971).
23. Indianapolis Oolite Stone Co. v. Alexander King Stone Co., 206 Ind. 412, 418, 190
N.E. 57, 59 (1934); Kinney v. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind. 252, 255, 90 N.E. 129,
130 (1909).
24. Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Boonville, 215 Ind. 552, 558, 20 N.E.2d 648, 651
(1939).
25. IND. CODE § 32-11-1-1 (1971). An exception to this requirement is recognized
where eminent domain proceedings are brought by the state highway department, or any
state board, agency, or commission which has taken over the duties of that department to
locate, relocate, construct, repair, and/or maintain Indiana public highways. IND. CODE § 32-
11-1-9 (1971).
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faith," and must be alleged and proven by the condemnor before the
court has jurisdiction to proceed." If the owner is unwilling to sell
below a price considered by the condemnor to be excessive, 8 the
condemnor may institute a proceeding in eminent domain by filing
a complaint with the clerk of the circuit or superior court of the
county where the land or other property or right is situated." Notice
of the proceedings must then be sent to the condemnee requiring
him to appear in court and show cause why the property should not
be appropriated."' The landowner is then entitled to a hearing on the
question of the right of the condemnor to appropriate the property.',
At this time, the court must rule upon any objections made by the
condemneeY.3 Should all the objections be sustained, the legal effect
is the same as that of sustaining a demurrer to the complaint in a
civil action.33 Opportunity may then be given to the condemnor to
amend his complaint or appeal to the state supreme or appellate
court from the decision.3 1
Should the objections be overruled, the court must appoint
three appraisers to assess the landowner's damages.35 If the land-
owner desires to appeal the court's decision to overrule the objec-
tions and to appoint the appraisers, he may do so at this time.3 The
26. See Wampler v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 241 Ind. 449, 172 N.E.2d 67 (1961):
What constitutes a "good faith" or "bona fide" offer to purchase? Each case must
be determined in light of its own particular circumstances. However, the authorities
generally indicate that where there is disagreement regarding the value of property,
if a reasonable offer is made honestly and in good faith and a reasonable effort has
been made to induce the owner to accept it, the requirements of the statute for an
offer to purchase have been met.
Id. at 456-57, 172 N.E.2d at 71 (footnotes omitted).
27. Slider v. Indianapolis & L. Traction Co., 42 Ind. App. 304, 309-10, 85 N.E. 372, 375
(1908).
28. See Wampler v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 241 Ind. 449, 457, 172 N.E.2d 67, 71 (1961),
where the court held that the attempt to agree need not be pursued further than to develop
the fact that an agreement to purchase was not possible at any price which the condemnor
was willing to pay.
29. IND. CODE § 32-11-1-2 (1971).
3t0. Id. § 32-11-1-3.
31. Cemetery Co. v. Warren School Township, 236 Ind. 171, 178, 139 N.E.2d 538, 541
(1958).
32. INn. CODE § 32-11-1-5 (1971).
33. Lebanon v. Public Serv. Co., 214 Ind. 295, 300, 14 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1938).
34. I~n. CODE § :32-11-1-5 (1971).
:35. Id. The appraisers must be disinterested freeholders of the county in which the land
is situated. Id. § 32-11-1-4.
316. INn. CODE § 32-11-1-5 (1971).
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duties of the appraisers consist of assessing the damages, or the
benefits and damages, resulting from the condemnation process. 7 If
either party is aggrieved by the assessment he may file written
exceptions within ten days after the appraisal reports are filed."
Should any exception be made, "the cause shall further proceed to
issue, trial and judgment as in civil actions .
The Civil Action
A major portion of all governmental acquisition is achieved by
negotiation and settlement." Therefore, the procedure as outlined
above may not be used in its entirety. But when the issue of com-
pensation to be paid for the taking does reach trial as a civil action,
many difficulties may be encountered. The use of technical terms
and procedures in determining "value" of the subject property may
cause confusion in the minds of jurors." Complications also result
from the presence of three conflicting values-market value, value
to the owner and value to the taker. 2 Wide disparity is common
among appraisals prepared for each party.13 Two basic reasons exist
for this difference in valuation. The first is that the meaning of
"value" is not, and probably cannot, be defined with mathematical
precision." Second, the determination of the market value of prop-
erty is intertwined with the value placed by the condemnee on his
:37. Id. § 32-11-1-6.
38. Id. § 32-11-1-8.
39. Id.
40. MacBride, Valuation for Condemnation, in A.B.A. NATIONAL INSTITUTE, CONDEMNA-
TION, COMPENSATION AND THE COURTS, at 9 (1968).
41. See Yates, Testimony of the Expert Appraiser in Condemnation Proceedings, 32
WASH. L. REV. 314, 317 (1957), where the author also cites lack of preparation as a cause of
such confusion.
42. 1 0CRGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 46, at 222-24 (2d ed.
195:3).
4:3. See Bishop, Condemnation Trial Techniques for the Condemnor, in A.B.A. NA-
TIONAl. INSTITUTF, CONDEMNATION, COMPENSATION AND THE COURTS, at 177 (1968), where the
aut hur notes that differences in appraisals of over 100 percent are not uncommon.
44. See Andrews v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 135 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied :320 U.S. 748 (1943):
"Value" is not a single purpose word. Men have all but driven themselves mad in
an effort to definitize its meaning. The problem arises in its most perplexing form
when, as here, property has not in fact been sold and an effort is made to ascertain
what it would have fetched if it had been sold. The answer is obviously a guess. . ..
As we recently said, the word "value" almost always "involves a conjecture, a guess,
a prediction, a prophesy.
Id. at :317 (footnotes omitted).
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property and the price the condemnor is willing to pay. Different
peol)Ie will view property value with varying considerations, espe-
cially when each is seeking to protect his own interests.
Upon reaching trial, the litigation becomes a battle of experts.
As in all litigation, each attorney must be thoroughly acquainted
with his case in order to effectively present his evidence and to
successfully cross-examine and rebut testimony offered by expert
appraisers called by opposing counsel." It is submitted that unless
full disclosure of appraisal reports is allowed, adequate trial prepa-
ration is unduly inhibited. This is because establishing the amount
of just compensation for the taking is both difficult and confusing.
Numerous legally compensable damages must be considered. A
number of methods may be utilized in determining market value.
And ultimately, problems may be encountered due to the role that
an expert appraiser's judgment plays throughout this process.
THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION
Damages which are generally compensable and which form the
basis for providing just compensation fall within the following cate-
gories:
First. The fair market value of each parcel of property
sought to be appropriated, and the value of each separate
estate or interest therein;
Second. The fair market value of all improvements
pertaining to the realty, if any, on the portion of the real
estate to be condemned;
Third. The damages, if any, to the residue of the land
of such owner or owners to be caused by taking out the part
sought to be appropriated;
Fourth. Such other damages, if any, as will result to
any persons or corporation from the construction of the
improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."
The appraiser must necessarily weigh all these elements of damage
before arriving at an opinion on value.
45. See Nizer, The Art of the Jury Trial, 32 CORN. L.Q. 59, 68 (1946).
46. IND. CODE § 32-11-1-6 (1971).
19741
et al.: Condemnation in Indiana: Discovery of Expert Appraisal Reports
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
416 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Fair Market Value of the Property Appropriated
The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that the measure of the
"fair market value" of property taken by eminent domain is the
amount that the land could be sold for if the owner were willing to
sell at the time of the appropriation.47 Market value is a highly
ambiguous term, being given a wide variety of meanings both by
courts and economists." Qualified valuation experts are the first to
admit that the determination of market value is an inexact sci-
ence.49 Different formulae, rules and experience must be applied
prior to formulating an appraisal opinion.5 Furthermore, the use of
each may vary widely depending upon the circumstances of each
case, since in making his appraisal the expert may employ any
commonly accepted appraisal technique and consider any factor
which may affect the sale value of the property at the time of the
taking."
Appraisers use three primary methods in determining the mar-
ket value of a particular piece of property. From the appraiser's
viewpoint, an adequate appraisal should include each of these
methods where they are applicable.2 Often, each method is subject
to error when the expert relies upon personal judgment rather than
a sufficient amount of market data. 53 Because expert testimony is
so important, each party should scrutinize the bases upon which his
appraisal has been formulated before reliance is placed upon it in
court.
A. Market Approach
The first method, and probably the most widely used,54 is the
market approach. The market approach involves the utilization of
comparable sales which tend to indicate the market value of the
S... ... n .. .- a -- l,.°' .. ..o. V. Gehdai , 24i ind. 589, , i72 N.E.Zd : , 205
(1961); Albertson Cemetery Ass'n v. Fuhrer, 192 Ind. 606, 613, 137 N.E. 545, 547 (1923).
48. SMITH, Is THE APPRAISAL WITNESS QUALIFIED?, at 2 (1971).
49. Bishop, supra note 43, at 161.
50. Id.
51. INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, CONDEMNATION IN INDIANA, at 86 (1966). See also
Gradison v. State, Ind. __, 300 N.E.2d 67, 72 (1973).
52. Note, Real Estate Valuation in Condemnation Cases-The Place for the Expert, 43
NER. L. REV. 137, 141 (1963).
5:. SMITH, supra note 48, at. 6.
54. Bishop, supra note 43, at 161-62.
(Vol. 8
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property being taken. These sales must have been voluntarily made
within the immediate neighborhood of the property being con-
demned and must not have occurred within the remote past.5 Un-
less these criteria are met, the sales are not relevant to market value
and are inadmissible at trial." Many personal judgments are re-
quired to weigh the various similarities and differences between
each comparable sale property and the property being taken. For
example, a sale of property located two miles away in a congested
city might be too remote to be used as a comparable sale, although
such a distance would be of little importance in an agricultural
area.57
The appraiser must also research carefully into the data sur-
rounding each comparable sale due to the formulation of various
additional rules of admissibility. For example, offers to purchase or
sell the comparable sale property are inadmissible as evidence of
value." Exchanges of property are also inadmissible unless the mar-
ket value of the property given in exchange and used as a compara-
ble sale is proven.5" Independent evidence of forced sales, purchases
made for the expansion of factories, schools, or similar properties,
or purchases reflecting temporary market conditions, artificial sti-
muli, or governmental regulation should arguably not be used as
comparable sales. 0 The information to determine whether the com-
55. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Darling, 239 Ind. 237, 242, 154 N.E.2d 881, 883
(1959).
56. Admissibility of evidence of comparable sales is, however, largely within the discre-
tion of the trial court. Gradison v. State, - Ind. __, 300 N.E.2d 67, 79 (1973).
57. See id.:
The terms "similarly situated" and "immediate neighborhood" .. are. . . relative
terms. The more commonplace the property, the easier it is to find two or more alike
or nearly alike. Accordingly, a greater degree of similarity should be required, and
the size of the geographic area encompassing the properties to be compared may
properly be more restrictive, as an element of similarity. As the property under
consideration becomes less commonplace, however, the area may properly be en-
larged, without losing what would logically be regarded as similarity. . . . Practical
considerations enter into such judgments that preclude establishing fixed rules and
formulas.
Id. at 78.
58. State v. Lincoln Memory Gardens, Inc., 242 Ind. 206, 213, 177 N.E.2d 655, 658
(1961).
59. United States v. Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied. 366 U.S. 944 (1961).
60. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 22-26, at 99-132 (2d
ed. 1953). See also State v. Quackenbush, - Ind. - , 303 N.E.2d 830, 833 (1973), where
19741
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parable sale would thus be inadmissible might be discovered
through interviews with buyer and seller, by consulting with local
real estate brokers, by researching county records or by inspecting
listings and offers on the comparable sale.' Therefore, not only is
there a possibility of error in personal judgment, but also in factual
data due to a lack of research, resulting in the exclusion of the
comparable sale as irrelevant to market value.
B. Cost Approach
A second method for determining market value, utilized pri-
marily when improved land is being condemned, is the cost ap-
proach. This method involves estimating the replacement cost of
the improvements on the land at present market price, less esti-
mated accrued depreciation, plus estimated land value." The pri-
mary function of reproduction cost in determining market value is
to set an upper limit beyond which an appraisal should not ordinar-
ily go." While the structure may add little or nothing to the value
of the land, it seldom adds more to it than the reproduction cost. 4
An important use of the cost approach is in the condemnation of
''service properties" which are owned for nonprofit uses and which
only occasionally come on the market. Examples of such property
include churches, club-houses, golf courses, schools and university
buildings."
The cost approach has been criticized since it will generally not
reflect economic and market conditions. The approach is based
upon the assumption that the buyer of the property would want to
erect a substantially identical structure on the land if it were unim-
proved. A buyer will generally pay what he considers to be the
the court held that evidence of a comparable sale, the value of which has increased or
decreased as a result of the appropriation, is inadmissible.
NER. L. REV., 137, 141 (1963); see also Nestle v. Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 927-28 n.4, 496
P.2d 480, 484.85 n.4, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 572-73 n.4 (1972) (testimony of an expert indicating
the degree of research he had completed).
62. Bishop, supra note 43, at 166-67. Replacement cost is not applicable in estimating
the fair market value of land in a condemnation action. State v. Lincoln Memory Gardens,
Inc.. 242 Ind. 206, 213, 177 N.E.2d 655, 658 (1961).
6:3. 2 ORc.Ei., VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 188, at 3 (2d ed. 1953).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Note, Real Estate Valuation in Condemnation Cases-The Place for the Expert, 43
NERl. L. REV., 137, 139 (1963).
[Vol. 8
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market value of the land only upon the condition that he will be able
to erect the improvements he desires. If the building is not of the
type he desires, it does not enhance the value of the whole property
by the amount of its reproduction cost."7
A critical problem involved in the cost approach is the tendency
to omit full deductions for depreciation, obsolescence and inade-
(ttaCy o f the existing improvements. This omission will tend to in-
flate the estimate of market value. 5 It is therefore important for a
party to have knowledge of the amount of deductions used by the
opponent's expert appraiser when the cost approach is being ap-
plied. Obtaining the expert's appraisal report would be a quick and
efficient means of revealing this information.
C. Income Approach
The third method of measuring market value is the income
approach. A common illustration of the use of this approach is in
the condemnation of rented premises such as apartment houses or
office buildings." Essentially, the method consists of three steps: (1)
the computation of the net income (gross income less expenses); (2)
selection and application of a capitalization rate (discount factor);
and (3) the processing of the net income into an estimate of the
capital value by means of a capitalization (discount process). 70 It is
important to stress that it is not the income produced by the busi-
ness on the property, but evidence of rental income from the real
estate itself that is involved.7
Under the income approach, the appraiser is concerned with
the value of the future income potential of the property. This value
is generally measured by the net income which a fully informed
person may reasonably assume the property will produce during its
67. 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 188, at 3 (2d ed. 1953).
68. /d. § 199. at 57. The converse, or including too much for depreciation, ohsolesc-
(nc. and inadequacy, causing deflation in the estimate of market value, would of course also
be a prblel ).
69. Note, Eminent Domain: Approaches to Valuation of Real Estate with Emphasis on
Mineral Properties, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 311 (1972).
70. Bishop, supra note 43, at 168.
71. See State v. Heslar, Ind. -, 274 N.E.2d 261 (1971) (loss of profits may not
be used for the purpose of determining value of land and buildings). See also Evansville v.
Bartlett, 243 Ind. 464, 186 N.E.2d 10 (1962) (loss of profits by a lessee of the property
condemned is admissible in relation to the value of the leasehold).
19741
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remaining useful life.72 The capitalization rate is derived from sales
of comparable properties in the open market. An overall rate is then
obtained by computing the annual net income of the comparable
properties and dividing by their sale prices. The value of the prop-
erty being condemned then equals its annual net income divided by
the overall capitalization rate.73 Because a low capitalization rate
will reflect an increased value, the condemnee will be seeking a low
rate; conversely, the condemnor will be seeking a higher rate to
decrease the valuation.74
The appraiser will usually prefer comparable sales of similar
property or replacement cost of the improvements as an indication
of market value. If relevant sales are not available and the cost of
replacement of the structures would be worthless, the income ap-
proach may be the only alternative. For example, a run down and
badly located hotel or tenement building would not lead to an esti-
mate of the replacement cost and comparable sales might not be
available to show the market value of the property. Such a situation
would necessitate the use of the income approach.7 5
While these three methods of valuation are important in the
process of formulating an opinion on market value, the expert may
be required to compute other variables into his appraisal. One such
variable is that he is not limited to a determination of the market
value of the property as reflected by its present use. Rather, the
"highest and best use" to which the subject property can be adapted
may be considered. "
Highest and Best Use
The American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers defines high-
est and best use as
Itihe most profitable use to which the property can be put.
The ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - oniio ofe higcsh and,~b~A~ 4
72. Note, Eminent Domain: Approaches to Valuation of Real Estate with Emphasis on
Mineral I'ropcrtics, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 312 (1972).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 1 ORGEI., VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 157, at 648-50 (2d ed.
1953I).
76. Eg., Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ritzert, 251 Ind. 245, 246, 240 N.E.2d 808,
808 (1968); Muncie & P. Traction Co. v. Hall, 173 Ind. 292, 294, 90 N.E. 312, 313 (1910).
[Vol. 8
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most profitable continued use to which the property is
adapted or needed, or likely to be in demand in the reasona-
bly near future. However, elements affecting value which
depend upon events or a combination of occurrences which,
while in the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be
reasonably probable, should be excluded from considera-
tion. Also, if the intended use is dependent on an uncertain
act of another person, the intention cannot be considered.
That use of land which may reasonably be expected to pro-
duce the greatest net return to land over a given period of
time. The legal use which will yield to land the highest
present value. Sometimes called optimum use.7
The value of the property for a specific future use which the owner
has contemplated is not, however, admissible." A common example
used in demonstrating this exception is where an owner of farm land
has contemplated subdividing the land into residential lots. While
the value of the land for building purposes may be considered, the
appraiser may not consider the undeveloped tract of land as though
the contemplated subdivision is an accomplished fact since this
would be basing value upon conjecture."
One event which may be deemed "reasonably probable" in de-
termining highest and best use is a change in zoning classification.
Thus, in State Roads Commission v. Warriner,9 the property being
condemned was zoned for residential use. The defendants argued
that at the time of the appropriation, there was a substantial possi-
bility that if the land had not been taken by eminent domain, it
would have been reclassified for light industrial use within a reason-
able time. In allowing the jury to consider this possibility, the court
stressed the fact that there was evidence of population growth in the
area, a marked expansion of the area's commercial growth toward
the property and a demand by industry for such land. The property
was also in close proximity to land already zoned as light industrial
and the property was particularly adaptable for such use.
Utilization of existing structures for purposes other than their
77. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY AND
HANDBOOK, at 92 (4th ed. 1966).
78. State v. Hamer, 211 Ind. 570, 573, 199 N.E. 589, 592 (1936).
79. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d 553 (1965).
80. 211 Md. 480, 128 A.2d 248 (1957).
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present use may also be reasonably probable. For example, a struc-
ture may have been functoning as a single family residence at the
time of taking. However, if the home is suitable as an apartment
house, and such use would be more profitable than renting the
entire building as a unit, the owner may be entitled to have this fact
considered by the jury in determining the amount of damages."'
Inherent in the determination of highest and best use is a cer-
tain degree of speculation. But this speculation must be based upon
detailed research. Before expressing any opinion, the appraiser must
have a thorough knowledge of the property and the surrounding
community as well as a grasp of the principles of land and property
utilization.8 2 Physical restrictions of the land are highly relevant in
his appraisal-i.e., whether there is sufficient irrigation and acreage
to support a profitable farm enterprise or whether the existing
structures upon the land make it unavailable for any use inconsist-
ent with future improvements."4 Nonphysical limitations upon the
use of property, such as deed restrictions, are also highly relevant s'
Up to this point, it has been shown that market value is a
complex concept. An appraiser will normally attempt to apply and
correlate all the factors discussed above. Yet there are additional
elements of an adequate appraisal to be considered. These include
damages and benefits to the remainder of the property when there
is a partial taking and "other" damages generally compensable.
Damages to the Residue
There are a great number of condemnation cases where only a
partial taking of property is involved. When this occurs, the mea-
sure of just compensation is the "difference between the market
value of the entire tract before the taking and the market value of
the residue after the taking" in addition to the fair market value of
the land appropriated. 6
The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that anything affecting
81. See Bonaparte v. Baltimore, 131 Md. 80, 83-84, 101 A. 594, 595 (1917).
82. Crouch, A Perspective Look at Highest and Best Use, in A.B.A. NATIONAL INSTITUTE,
CONDEMNATION, COMPENSATION AND THE COURTS, at 76 (1968).
8:3. United States v. 131.79 Acres of Land, 296 F. Supp. 1381, 1384-85 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
84. Crouch, supra note 82, at 76.
85. Id.
86. Stevenson v. State, 244 Ind. 452, 454, 193 N.E.2d 369, 370 (1963).
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fair market value of the residue at the time of the taking may be
considered in arriving at just compensation. 7 Examples of factors
which may affect the market value of the residue include its reduc-
tion in size or shape, thereby reducing its saleability,"" and cost of
fencing made necessary by improvements erected upon the con-
demned land. "' Should the use to which the condemnor puts the
land appropriated cause danger and annoyance, that use may affect
the sale value of the residue and may therefore be compensable?1'
Because so many elements of damage are entitled to consideration
in this area, one author has suggested that counsel for the condem-
nee be as creative as possible.91 It is important to emphasize, how-
ever, that the various items of loss must only be considered with
respect to their effect upon market value, not as specific items
which are independently compensable.94
Other Damages
The appraiser may determine "such other damages as will re-
sult . . . from the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff (condemnor)." 3 Such damages are allowed
87. State v. Ahaus, 223 Ind. 629, 634, 63 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1945). In order to qualify for
these severance damages, three requirements must be met: unity of ownership, unity of use
and contiguity. State v. Heslar, __ Ind. , 274 N.E.2d 261, 265 (1971). In relation to these
requirements, the court in Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674, 91 N.E. 234 (1910) stated:
It is settled that in determining the amount of special benefits or damages sustained
by any one proprietor, all land belonging to him lying in a contiguous body, and used
together for a common purpose, will be considered as one tract or farm, without
regarded to governmental subdivision. . . .This principle cannot be extended to
cover lands owned by different proprietors, although contiguous and used under one
management and for a common purpose. Claims for damages in proceedings of this
character are personal, and must be asserted in the name of the actual owners of the
lands affected.
Id. at 683-84, 91 N.E. at 238 (footnotes omitted).
88. New Jersey, I. & I. R.R. v. Tutt, 168 Ind. 205, 218, 80 N.E. 420, 425 (1907).
89. Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674, 681, 91 N.E. 234, 237 (1910).
9). E.g., Crumpacker v. State, - Ind. __, 271 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1971) (cost of
constructing a drive for access to residue); State v. Vaughan, 243 Ind. 221, 227, 184 N.E.2d
143, 146 (1962) (testimony proper regarding amount of fill necessary to render land suitable
for possible use contemplated by landowner); Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Jones, 240
Ind. 434, 440, 166 N.E.2d 127, 130 (1960) (power lines); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Darling, 239 Ind. 237, 241, 154 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1958) (danger of gas pipeline exploding); New
Jersey, I. & I. R.R. v. Tutt, 168 Ind. 205, 218, 80 N.E. 420, 425 (1907) (hazard of fire from
passing locomotives).
91. INDIANA STATE BAR AssociATION, CONDEMNATION IN INDIANA, at 91 (1966).
92. Crumpacker v. State, __ Ind. __, 271 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1971).
93. IND. CODE § 32-11-1-6 (1971).
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as additional compensation beyond the fair market value of the land
appropriated."' This area of damages is largely undeveloped by case
law in Indiana.", It is not intended to cover consequential damages
of any kind since many of them are too speculative to be compensa-
ble." Elements of damages arguably falling within these provisions
are also likely to be used in the determination of fair market value
of the residue.' 7
Benefi ts
Where the right of eminent domain is exercised by the state or
a county for public highway purposes, or by a municipal corporation
for a public use, the appraiser must assess any resulting benefit to
the residue." These benefits may then be used to offset the damages
to the residue and other consequential damages."
To be used in determining just compensation, benefits must be
special and result directly or peculiarly to the residue of the prop-
erty appropriated.""' Benefits are deemed special when they increase
the value of the residue, relieve it from a burden or make it espe-
cially adaptable to a purpose which enhances its value."' Although
94. State v. Terre Haute, 250 Ind. 613, 618, 238 N.E.2d 459, 462 (1968). Such damages
are allowed only where the facts in the particular case justify them. Id.
95. INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, CONDEMNATION IN INDIANA, at 91 (1966).
96. E.g., Cheathem v. Evansville, __ Ind. __, 278 N.E.2d 602, 607 (1972) (cost and
relocation expenses not included in just compensation); State v. Heslar, - Ind. -, 274
N.E.2d 261, 266 (1971) (loss of business or profits are too speculative to be compensable). But
'ee id. at 385 (total denial of access due to method of construction of any improvement on
land appropriated is compensable); State v. Terre Haute, 250 Ind. 613, 623, 238 N.E.2d 459,
465 (1968) (compensation allowed for expenses of planning and engineering work actually
performed, with regard to a proposed sewage disposal plant, prior to the condemnation
action).
97. INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, CONDEMNATION IN INDIANA, at 91-92 (1961).
98. IND. CODE § 32-11-1-6 (1971).
99. Id. See cases cited notes 86-97 supra and accompanying text.
I(). itate v. Smith, 237 Ind. 72, 77, 143 N.E.2d 666, 669 (1957).
101. Id. For an explanation of special and general benefits, see State v. Ahaus, 223 Ind.
629. 63 N.E. 199 (1945):
1Blenefits and injuries are of two kinds: (1) General or public, being such as are not
peculiar to the particular proprietor, part of whose property is taken, but those
benefits in which he shares and those injuries which he sustains in common with the
community or locality at large. (2) Special or local, being those peculiar to the
particular landowner, part of whose property is appropriated, and which are not
common to the community or locality at large, such, on one hand, as rendering his
adjoining lands more useful and convenient to him, or otherwise giving them a
peculiar increase in value, and, on the other, rendering them less useful or conven-
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the burden of proving benefits is on the condemnor,' 2 it is important
for the condemnee to prepare for this issue. The reason for this
preparation is that the jury may not award full market value for the
land appropriated should the evidence demonstrate that the bene-
fits exceed all damages to the residue and the market value of the
land taken.
THE EXPERT'S APPRAISAL
From this summary of the numerous elements used in deter-
mining just compensation, it is apparent that a complete and thor-
ough appraisal is needed before proceeding to trial. Contingencies
that might be encountered as well as the ability to develop a pursu-
asive case before the fact finder necessitates a great deal of time and
effort. As one author stated:
An appraisal is to a condemnation award what plans are to
a finished building. However skilled the craftsman, he can-
not improve upon the architect's work; at best, he can only
fulfill the architect's expectations. Similarly, the negotiator
or attorney armed with a poor appraisal is unlikely to
achieve the fairness to both condemnor and condemnee
that is denoted as "just compensation." A reliable, full-
supported appraisal, far from being a luxury, must accom-
pany every condemnation." 3
A comprehensive study of what appraisal criteria are or are not
judicially accepted is essential. Should an element of damage be
included in the appraisal which is not compensable, exposure of this
fact at trial may diminish the expert's credibility. Weak points in
the appraisal must be uncovered prior to trial. Revision or re-
examination of the initial valuation may then be needed. Market
data relating to comparable sales, income properties and cost con-
struction items must be deeply probed. What may be relevant on
the surface might actually be inadmissible following cross-
examination. While such research will result in a strong appraisal
opinion, any benefit may be lost if the data is not reduced into some
lent, or otherwise, in a peculiar way, diminishing their value.
Id. at 6:16-37, 63 N.E.2d at 202 (footnotes omitted).
102. Gradison v. State, __ Ind. __, 300 N.E.2d 67, 75 (1973).
103. Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look into the Practices
of (ondem nation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430, 437-38 (1967).
19741
et al.: Condemnation in Indiana: Discovery of Expert Appraisal Reports
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
426 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tangible form for later reference. The appraisal report therefore be-
comes of primary importance in the trial preparation of a condem-
nation action.
The Appraisal Report
An adequate appraisal report will include data relied upon by
the expert, his opinions and conclusions, and the methods of ap-
praisal he used."" If the expert does not ordinarily proceed in this
fashion, he should be required to do so by the attorney who hired
him. A lawyer should not put an expert on the stand without know-
ing and understanding what the expert is going to say and how he
arrived at his opinions and conclusions. The most efficient and inex-
pensive way of learning a majority of the expert's expected testi-
mony is through referral to it in some tangible form. As a practical
matter, a good expert will not be inexpensive. 1 5 Thus, he may not
be available for consultation while the attorney prepares the case.
The report will therefore be indispensable prior to trial. Written
reports with full text analyses should also be a requirement from the
viewpoint of the expert. He may be much too busy to recall the
appraisal valuation. The report will serve to refresh his memory
befbre trial, thereby preparing him to present cogent testimony and
to withstand vigorous cross-examination.
Due to the various objective and subjective elements which the
report may contain concerning market value and damages, the like-
lihood of two appraisers arriving at the same valuation is extremely
remote.'" The problem is further aggravated by overzealous experts
who shade their reports in an attempt to favor the position of their
104. See THE PRINCIPLES OF APPRAISAL PRACTICE AND CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS § 8 (1964).
105. See Yates, Testimony of the Expert Appraiser in Condemnation Proceedings, 32
WAsIh f, R v :114 (1.57.)
Could it be that this appraisal service is sought and had too cheaply? One usually
gets what he pays for. I would urge upon lawyers that as an initial step in accepting
condemnation defense, the client be well-informed of the importance of and proper
cost of good and sufficient evidence of valuation.
Id. at 318.
106. Bishop, supra note 43, at 177. See also 6816.5 Acres of Land v. United States, 411
F.2d 834, 836 (10th Cir. 1969) (condemnor's experts: $120,000 & $140,000; condemnee's ex-
perts: $443,040 & $635,827); United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420, 421
(E.D.N.Y. 1961) (condemnor's experts: $63,000 & $73,400; condemnee's expert: $101,935);
United States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 25 F.R.D. 88, 91 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (differences in
valuation of damages to the residue ranging from $11,000 to $67,000).
[Vol. 8
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employers."7 Even though total impartiality were to be retained, the
expert may overlook certain elements of damage or feel that they
have no relevance to the particular property.""' Unfortunately, this
divergence also adversely affects ultimate verdicts given by juries.
Jury members may be bewildered by the clashes between these
experts. As a result, too often a jury will bring back a verdict incon-
sistent with the evidence presented.""' This problem demonstrates
a need to provide a procedure by which a condemnation trial will
become more of a determination of the merits of the controversy. It
is submitted that the value of pretrial discovery of appraisal reports
in this area is compelling enough to allow such discovery as a matter
of course.
THE VALUE OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF THE APPRAISAL REPORT
Before considering the value of allowing discovery of appraisal
reports, consideration must be given to the reason for concentrating
upon production of the reports themselves instead of other discovery
procedures. Production would be the most inexpensive and efficient
method of obtaining discovery in a condemnation action. Produc-
tion does not involve the time necessary to draft lengthy and com-
plicated interrogatories in attempting to discover the facts and
opinions to be testified to by the adverse party's expert. The time
and effort needed to reply to the interrogatories also imposed on the
107. See Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look into the
Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 430 (1967): "[Elxperts, whatever the nature
of their employment, tend to view discretionary matter in somewhat of a colored way." Id.
at 44:3. See also 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 247, at 261 (2d
ed. 195:3).
Fault may also be placed upon the attorney. Some lawyers desire to control the appraiser
they employ by making unwarranted and unreasonable assumptions under the guise of legal
theories. The appraiser may not find out until later that such assumptions are unreasonable.
SMITH, Is THE APPRAISAL WITNESS QUALIFIED?, at 11 (1971).
108. Another important reason for this divergence of opinion is the constant motion and
fluctuation of the real estate market according to the laws of supply and demand. Levy, The
Appraisal Process, 41 N.Y.S.B.J. 108, 110 (1969).
109. In reaching their verdict, the jury will oftentimes simply average the estimates of
market value presented by each party's expert. See, e.g., United States v. 412.93 Acres of
Land, 455 F.2d 1242, 1245 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D.
420. 422 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
It has been suggested that irrational verdicts may be controlled by the use of special
interrogatories to the jury. Dillon, Often-Overlooked Aspects of Trial Technique in Condem-
nation Cases, in A.B.A. NATIONAL INSTITUTE, CONDEMNATION, COMPENSATION AND THE COURTS,
at 118 (1968).
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answering party is not present when production is used. Answers to
interrogatories may not include all the required information."' Ad-
ditional questions will then be needed or the attorney may be forced
to obtain a court order requiring full disclosure if it is believed the
adverse party is being evasive. Depositions might also be utilized,
but this is the most expensive procedure in the discovery process."'
If the condemnation proceeding involves a small tract of land, the
expense may be prohibitive. Since the landowner is an unwilling
seller, he should not have to incur the added expense of these proce-
dures to take advantage of discovery." 2
Subjecting appraisal reports to discovery will also prevent the
expert from wasting his time travelling to be deposed or helping to
answer interrogatories. 13 A danger exists that should the expert be
taken away from his job for discovery proceedings, he may not want
to take the time to involve himself in future trials."'
110. One author has noted that interrogatories are like a "skirmish line, thrown forward
to feel out the enemy, determine his weaknesses, explore the ground, and guide the advance."
Address by William H. Speck, A Symposium on the Use of Depositions and Discovery under
the Federal Rules, in 12 F.R.D. 131, 134 (1951). The problem confronted is that the court may
then be compelled to become involved in the dispute, thereby wasting both the court's and
each party's time.
111. Id. at 137-38.
112. Although this reasoning applies only to the landowner, once he is granted discov-
ery, the condemnor should also be extended this privilege. See In re Appropriation of the
Property of Maiden, 26 Ohio Misc. 19, 268 N.E.2d 824 (C.P., Lorain County 1970).
Minimizing the cost of discovery is also a solution to the abusiveness of expensive deposi-
tions which serve as a means of "shaking down" the deposed party when his opponent has
no intention of proceeding to trial. See generally Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States
District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1132, 1152 (1951); Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of
Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 121 (1949).
113. In construing MD. R. Paoc. 410(c)(2), the court in Wilson v. Baltimore Transit Co.,
Daily Record (Sup. Ct. Balt., Md., May 7, 1958) held that an object of the rule was to make
unnecessary, where possible, the oral examination of experts prior to trial. Thus, not only
would the expert's time be saved, counsel and litigants would not be wasting their time either.
MD. R. Paoc. 410(c)(2) provides:
c. Except as otherwise provided in Rule 406 (Order to Protect Party and Deponent),
a party may by written interrogatory or by deposition require that an opposing party
produce or submit for inspection:
2. Report of Expert.
A written report of an expert, whom the opposing party proposes to call as a witness,
whether or not such report was obtained by the opposing party in anticipation of trial
or in preparation for litigation. If such expert has not made a written report to the
opposing party, such expert may be examined upon written questions or by oral
deposition as to his findings and opinions.
114. This may seem to be a minute danger, but in view of the shortage of qualified
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The saving of time and expense by allowing production is, of
course, conditioned on the existence of sufficient appraisal reports.
If they are adequately informative concerning the expected testi-
mony, no further discovery may be needed. Thus, obtaining the
reports prior to trial will simply advance the time of disclosure from
the time of trial to the period immediately preceeding it."'
The first benefit that might be gained from such a procedure
is an increase in pretrial settlement, at a sum which is fair to both
the condemnee and condemnor." ' Studies have indicated that the
condemnee who settles his case is "shockingly underpaid.""' 7 In one
study, it was determined that only about 15.7 percent obtained
compensation in the settlement process at better than the lowest
appraisal made by the condemnor, 56.9 percent received under 90
percent of the lowest appraisal, and 8.6 percent received less than
50 percent." ' Such results should not be allowed to persist. Full
discovery of appraisal reports may help in eliminating any inequity.
Upon obtaining the adverse party's appraisal report, the party and
his expert can make a thorough examination to determine whether
it contains an accurate reflection of market value of the property.
experts, it is at least something to consider. See generally SMITH, IS THE APPRAISAL WITNESS
QUALIFIED?, at 10-15 (1971); Yates, Testimony of the Expert Appraiser in Condemnation
Proceedings, 32 WASH. L. REv. 314, 315-16 (1957).
115. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
116. This result will depend upon the willingness of each party to compromise. See
generally Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D. 129
(1971):
[Elxperience has shown that reasonable men who negotiate in good faith are quite
likely to discover areas of agreement which will preserve the essential interests of all
concerned.
The demands of the parties may be represented by two large circles that
barely touch, but the important fact is that they usually intersect and that
is this common segment which represents the not impossible area of agree-
ment. The precise point of accord may fall anywhere within this field, but it
cannot fall outside of it.
Id. at 147 (footnotes omitted).
117. Nassau, supra note 103, at 442.
118. Id. at 442-43. See also COMMITTEE ON PuaLic WORKS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESs., STUDY
OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED By REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN
FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1965), where studies showed that
of some 34,400 acquisitions on which negotiation date was available, 24,877, or 72 percent,
represented purchases in which the U.S. Army Engineer's initial offer was less than the
agency approved appraisal and 7,897, or 23 percent, of these were actually purchased at less
than that appraisal. The study concluded that many attitudes on the part of the government
hindered any serious attempt to resolve differences over the value of property appropriated.
Id. at 117-18.
19741
et al.: Condemnation in Indiana: Discovery of Expert Appraisal Reports
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
430 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Both the discovered report and the party's own report may be com-
pared and analyzed in terms of the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of each. Both parties can then effectively evaluate their cases
to determine their chances of obtaining a favorable verdict.'"' Reali-
zation of the expense of a trial and the possibility of an unfavorable
verdict will not coerce the condemnee into abandoning his case. 2"
If either party feels he has a solid appraisal in comparison to his
opponent's, this fact will also provide a favorable position in negoti-
ating for a settlement.
While there is a split of opinion over extending the use of dis-
covery solely to determine whether a party should settle his case,'2'
any such prohibition should be disregarded in condemnation litiga-
tion. The object of the trial is to provide just compensation. If the
expense of trial can be avoided, with the condemnor and the con-
demnee being satisfied with the settlement, any method available
to provide just compensation should be considered. This is espe-
cially important to the condemnee who is merely an innocent by-
stander who finds himself in court through no fault of his own and
who bears the burden of proving his damages for the appropria-
tion. 22
Pretrial production of appraisal reports will also prevent false
claims from going to trial. 2: The condemnor may be attempting to
obtain the property at an extremely low price. The appraisal report
will undoubtedly reflect such an attempt.'24 Upon receiving pursu-
asive appraisal reports from the condemnee, the condemnor may
decide not to proceed to trial, especially if he feels the jury may be
more sympathetic to the condemnee. Furthermore, it may not al-
ways be the condemnor who falsely claims an unrealistic valuation.
Too often what a property owner believes his land to be worth is
119. Oftentimes, the lack of knowledge of where each expert differs inhibits settlement
because an intelligent evaluation of each party's position cannot be made. Long, supra note
1, at 129.
120. Most litigants, though, would probably prefer settlement to trial. A jury trial will
always be a calculated risk, while settlement provides a substantial vindication for each
party. Fox, supra note 116, at 147.
121. Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955) (no); Terry v. Fisher,
12 Il. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957) (yes).
122. (radison v. State, - Ind. - , :300 N.E.2d 67, 75 (1973).
123. 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE T 26.02[21, at 26-65 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MooREJ.
124. See note 107 supra.
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determined by a natural bias. "Suddenly every tree or shrub that
he planted, every nail or screw that he installed, each lease improve-
ment he negotiated, takes on a new meaning. '" 2" This inflation of
property value will also take on the flavor of falsity.'" Upon receiv-
ing the condemnor's appraisal report, the condemnee will discover
the harsh reality that he will not obtain his unrealistic expectations.
A knowledge of the possibility of wasting time and trial expense just
to defeat these expectations may make it undesirable for him to
continue the litigation.
One of the primary purposes of discovery is to narrow the issues
to be tried. 2 7 While courts have frequently stated that the only issue
in condemnation litigation is just compensation and therefore dis-
covery will not perform the function of narrowing any issues, 28 this
is a gross understatement. '9 As pointed out earlier, there are a vast
number of issues involved. Just compensation might be termed the
ultimate result to be obtained, consisting of various subsidiary is-
sues such as the validity, relevance and credibility of the tests made
by each appraiser; whether the comparable sales used at trial are
adequately representative of the property being taken; whether the
appraisers' underlying assumptions are valid; whether their meth-
ods of appraisal are acceptable; and whether the damages they as-
sessed to the residue are compensable and adequately reflect actual
damage. 30
Upon comparison of appraisal reports, the parties might con-
clude an agreement on a list of comparables, elements of damage,
methods of appraisal or whatever else which is acceptable to both.
Stipulations could then be prepared for use at trial.'' Even if only
partial agreement was reached, the trial would thus become less
time consuming.
125. Yates, Testimony of the Expert Appraiser in Condemnation Proceedings, 32 WASH.
L. REV. 314, 314-15 (1957).
126. See note 107 supra.
127. MOORE, supra note 123, 26.02[21, at 26-66.
128. E.g., United States v. 4.724 Acres of Land, 31 F.R.D. 290, 292 (E.D. La. 1962);
United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512, 518 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
129. See United States v. 2,001.10 Acres of Land, 48 F.R.D. 305, 306 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
130. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968); Long, supra note 1,
at 128.
131. IND. R. Th. P. 16(C)(3):
Fact Stipulation. The attorneys shall stipulate in writing with reference to all facts
and issues not in genuine dispute.
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Full discovery of experts' reports will also prevent concealment
of any evidence relevant to the case.'32 Condemnation litigation
should not be a contest waged by diametrically opposed adver-
saries. 1:1:1 The obligation imposed upon the condemnor is to provide
a fair and just monetary settlement. The condemnee must not re-
ceive more than his property is worth. Relevant elements of damage
not disclosed at trial may prevent this balance from being struck.
The case law generally stands for the proposition that discovery
should provide a party with access to anything that is evidence in
his case.':"
Concealment of facts may also lead to another danger that
should be eliminated-surprise. If a party is unaware of certain
evidence or facts when making his own assessment, and this evi-
dence is introduced at trial by his opponent, the party may not only
be prejudiced but the trial may be unduly delayed by continu-
ances.' : Production of expert reports will tend to eliminate such a
problem. Again, the object in condemnation litigation is to provide
just compensation. This might not be the ultimate result when
tricking the opponent into mistakes or taking advantage of inadver-
tant errors is encouraged. All facts, opinions and conclusions should
be uncovered prior to trial, permitting each party the time to study
contentions of the adverse party and to explore their validity outside
the courtroom. As one court stated:
If surprise is eliminated the trial will better reflect the true
strengths of the conflicting claims. The adversary system is
1:12. MooRn , supra note 123, 26.02121, at 26-66.
133. See Shell v. State Road Dep't, 135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1961):
It must be borne in mind that in a condemnation proceeding the property of the
landowner is subject to taking without the landowner's consent. . . . [It is] incum-
bent upon the condemnor to award "just" compensation for the taking. In view of
this constitutional mandate, the awarding of compensation which is "just" should
be the care of the condemning authority as well as that of the party whose land is
being taken.
Unlike litigation between private parties condemnation by any governmental
authority should not be a matter of "dog eat dog" or "win at any cost." Such attitude
and procedure would be decidedly unfair to the property owner. He would be at a
disadvantage in every instance for the reason that the government has unlimited
resources created by its inexhaustible power of taxation.
Id. at 861.
134. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
135. See Nestle v. Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 929, 496 P.2d 480, 485, 101 Cal. Rptr.
568. 573 (1972).
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valued not for the contest but because it is believed truth
will emerge from the clash of competing presentations. The
greatest of champions may be felled by an unforeseen blow.
The more complete the advance disclosure, the greater the
likelihood that the true merits will be hammered out at
trial. 36
Another benefit resulting from such discovery is the prepara-
tion of the attorney for effective cross-examination and rebuttal of
evidence offered by an expert."' Knowledge of much of the expert's
expected testimony may shorten the time needed for cross-
examination and expedite the adjudication by allowing a party to
concentrate only upon those areas in rebuttal which are felt to be
necessary. An expert may be able to disagree promptly with another
expert's opinions or market data when first heard at trial, but com-
plete refutation often requires investigation and study. :' Effective-
ness on cross-examination also demands ample time for consulta-
tion and for education of the attorney prior to trial by his own
expert." ' Finally, cross-examination and rebuttal should attempt to
sharpen issues. The battle of wits in which each lawyer attempts to
outmaneuver his opponent may confuse rather than clarify the is-
sues.'"" The end result is that the jury may be relying solely upon
the relative skills of the lawyers themselves and not upon a sound
determination of the evidence.'4 '
136. Roe v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 28 Mich. App. 42, 52, 184 N.W.2d 350, 356 (1970).
137. See 2 W. HARVEY, INDIANA PRACTICE, at 457 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HARVEYI:
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation. The
lawyer even with the help of his own experts frequently cannot anticipate the particu-
lar approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which he will base his
judgment on the stand. . . . A California study of discovery and pre-trial in condem-
nation cases notes that the only substitute for discovery of experts' valuation materi-
als is "lengthy-and often fruitless-cross-examination during trial," and recom-
mends pre-trial exchanges of such material. . . . Similarly, effective rebuttal re-
quires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side.
Id. at 463.
See also United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963):
[lit needs no citation of authority to say that an expert is the most difficult witness
to cross-examine, particularly if one is unaware until trial of the substance of his
testimony.
Id. at 596.
138. Winner, Procedural Methods to Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97, 103 (1960).
139. Id.
140. Yates, Testimony of the Expert Appraiser in Condemnation Proceedings, 32 WASH.
L. REV. 314, 317 (1957).
141. Id.
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LIMITATIONS UPON DISCOVERY
However beneficial the production of appraisal reports might
be in condemnation proceedings, when courts have denied it, " 2 the
reasoning has generally been grounded upon three doctrines-the
attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine and the doc-
trine of unfairness.
The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege was developed to protect commu-
nications between a client and his attorney from public disclosure.
Such a disclosure, it was argued, might affect the outcome of the
litigation in a manner adverse to the client's interests.'" The com-
munication could, for example, constitute an admission by the
client that might be used against him at trial. "4 Discovery might
also prevent the client from giving his attorney facts which do not
present the case favorably." 5 Thus, the attorney would not have a
full and complete case history with which to prepare for trial.
Many courts have extended the attorney-client privilege to
communications of the client's expert, calling the expert an agent.
The theory behind these decisions is that the expert acts merely as
a messenger in relaying the client's communications, such as those
contained in an appraisal report, to the client's attorney.'4 Another
rationale for this extention is that the expert is in essence an assist-
ant counsel and should be treated similarly to an attorney for pur-
poses of discovery.'4 7
The better rule, and the one presently being followed by a ma-
jority of courts,"41 is that the privilege does not apply to experts. At
least it should apply only if the facts and circumstances surrounding
142. See cases cited note 9 supra.
1.A . ... , P.. . . ... f -i,- t ... - 4 1.. . . . .... .. .. . . . . .. . .; -.. . . .
16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 490 (1928).
144. Friedent hal, I)iscovery and Use of an Adverse Part>,'s Expert Information, 14 STAN.
1- R :v. 455, 4,56 (1961).
145. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979, 981 (E.D.
Wisc. 1969).
146. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 195 S.E.2d 615, 620 (S.C.
1973), where the court states that this appears to be the older view.
147. Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 COLUM. L. REV.
1026, 1050 (1950).
148. United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D. Md. 1963).
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the creation of the agency indicate that the expert was retained to
evaluate and pass on to the attorney matters which emanate in
confidence from the client. If the expert is to examine, evaluate and
subsequently testify regarding matters not in the nature of a confi-
dential communication from client to attorney, his report is not
privileged simply because it is reduced to writing and delivered to
an attorney."' Thus, in San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior
Court,'"' an expert had been hired to study deficiencies in the archi-
tecture of a medical office building-purely a nonconfidential mat-
ter-and the court allowed production of the report to the opposing
party. The same situation exists in a condemnation suit. The expert
is hired to appraise a piece of land, the land being open to public
view. Nothing confidential emanates from this relationship and
nothing about an opinion on the fair market value of the property
requires secrecy.''
The attorney-client privilege should be used only to protect
communications, not an expert's observations and conclusions.
These observations and conclusions actually constitute facts in an
eminent domain proceeding, relevant to the ultimate resolution of
just compensation. '15 1 Professor Moore, a frequently quoted author-
ity on federal practice and procedure, indicates that the opinions of
an expert do not fall within this privilege. Citing Hickman v.
Taylor,'"': which held that memoranda prepared by counsel himself
do not fall within the attorney-client privilege,' 4 Professor Moore
states that it naturally follows that expert reports prepared for an
attorney are not privileged either.' 5 Accordingly, the Indiana Rules
of Civil Procedure seem to express an intent to reject those decisions
holding an expert's information as privileged simply because of his
status as an expert.'
51
149. San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 202 , 373 P.2d 448,
452, 23 Cal. Rptr. 384, 388 (1962).
150. Id.
151. See also Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 223 A.2d 303, 304 (Me.
1966) (there cannot be an employer-expert privilege included within the attorney-client privi-
lege).
152. See generally Security Indus., Inc. v. Fickus, 439 P.2d 172 (Alas. 1968).
153. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
154. Id. at 508.
155. MOORE, supra note 123, 26.66[1], at 26-468-69.
156. HARVEY, supra note 137, at 462.
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The Work-Product Doctrine
The second limitation, the work-product doctrine, immunizes
from discovery any matter which has been gathered by a lawyer in
anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.'5 7 The principle
case cited in expounding this doctrine is Hickman v. Taylor.',5 The
Court in Hickman ruled that written statements, private memo-
randa and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse
party's counsel in the course of his legal duties fall outside the scope
of discovery. However, this is a qualified immunity.The Court
stated that written material received or prepared by a lawyer in
anticipation of litigation may be obtained where discovery of rele-
vant and nonprivileged facts is essential to the preparation of a
party's case. Such material would be discoverable upon a substan-
tial showing of "necessity or justification."'' 9 The work-product doc-
trine is thus a rule which balances the need for discovery with the
right to retain the benefit of one's own research.'""
Because it became a discretionary matter for the judge to de-
cide whether a particular piece of information was part of the work-
product of a lawyer, the doctrine produced a stumbling block for
those seeking discovery. Proponents of discovery sought to restrict
the doctrine in order to further the objectives of discovery in pro-
moting a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of litigation.
Others reacted against any form of intrusion into their trial prepara-
tion material by an opponent who was set on defeating their
clients. '
157. E.g., Riddle Spring Realty Co. v. State, 107 N.H. 271, 275, 220 A.2d 751, 755
(1966).
158. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
159. Id. at 510.
160. Thus, the application of the doctrine may depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case. See Shell v. State Road Dep't, 135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1961), where the court
distinguished the application of the doctrine, hoiding that while it may protect expert reports
and opinions in other litigation, it should not be applicable in condemnation cases.
We realize that the rule pronounced herein with reference to condemnation proceed-
ings is diametrically opposite to the prevailing rule in ordinary litigation. However,
we are convinced that there is no inconsistency because both rules are based upon
sound public policy when the sphere in which each operates is properly analyzed.
Id. at 860. See also United Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Del. 1960).
161. This conflict can perhaps best be represented by two statements made by the
Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947):
Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
[Vol. 8
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As in the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine
has been extended to agents utilized by the attorney to gather infor-
mation in preparation for trial. 62 Based on this extension, produc-
tion of appraisal reports has often been denied on the ground that
impressions, observations and opinions of an expert acting pursuant
to an attorney's instructions are immune from discovery.'"3 On the
other hand, a number of courts have refused to call discovery of
appraisal reports "an attempt to secure the . . . mental impressions
contained in the files and the mind of the attorney" and an interfer-
ence with the work-product of the lawyer." 4 Supervision of an expert
or acquisition of the reports by the attorney does not convert the
reports into the attorney's work-product.'65 The opinions of an ap-
praiser and the data and analysis upon which he rests his opinions
and conclusions are the product of the appraiser's expertise, not the
lawyer's. 16
One reason for employing the work-product doctrine to deny
discovery of appraisal reports is that a party, by obtaining the re-
ports, could exploit the trial preparation of his opponent. A party
who has not employed an expert at the time suit is filed would
discover the opinions, conclusions and underlying factual data used
by the adversary's expert in making his appraisal. The party could
then hire an expert who would determine the merits of the
information obtained, thereby saving time and expense in deciding
whether to settle or proceed to trial.'67 Although it is doubtful that
production of the report will alone be adequately informative on the
possibility of settlement, disposition of the case prior to trial is a
desirable result for both parties.6 Such an argument is also incon-
he has in his possession.
Id. at 507.
[A] common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery
was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to pursue its functions either
without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.
Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
162. E.g., Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 967 (1950) (statements taken by FBI agents constituted work-product of government's
attorneys since no valid distinction exists between materials prepared by counsel and those
prepared for counsel's use at trial).
163. E.g., United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
164. E.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 236 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
165. Security Indus., Inc. v. Fickus, 439 P.2d 172, 177 (Alas. 1968).
166. United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1967).
167. Long, supra note 1, at 125.
168. See cases cited notes 116-22 supro and accompanying text.
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sistent with the allowance of discovery of an ordinary witness in
which similar risks are involved. This risk is a necessary conse-
quence of formulating the issues.
Another argument used in denying production of appraisal re-
ports is that an attorney will forgo the use of experts if such discov-
ery is allowed.' The probability of this result is slight in condemna-
tion actions since expert testimony is usually essential for a proper
case to be presented. 7 "
Finally, it is asserted that should an expert obtain a report
compiled by the adversary's expert, different conclusions to support
his employer's position could be drawn. This result would be diffi-
cult to control in the areas of a condemnation trial where an expert's
opinion may be supported solely by his own judgment. 7 ' Because
an expert witness may escape any charges of perjury by pointing out
that he is testifying to his "opinion" and not to "facts," the risk of
false testimony may be greater than in the case of an ordinary
witness."'2
However valid the above considerations are in providing that
discovery should be limited in some manner, an absolute prohibi-
tion of discovery should not be the result. Most of these arguments
ignore the discretionary power of the court to prevent undue inter-
ference with trial preparation if abuses become apparent. For exam-
ple, the court could require each party to exchange his appraisal
169. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 74 (9th Cir. 1968) (argument raised but
rejected by the court).
170. See United States v. 131.76 Acres of Land, 296 F. Supp. 1381 (W.D. Mo. 1969),
where the court stated:
[Diefendant's counsel's expectation that he would be able to establish the fair
market value of the subject property by cross-examination of the government's ap-
praisal witness had been overly optimistic.
1d. at 1385.
171. See Long, supra note 1, at 125, where the author points out that this fear may
result from the distrust with which courts, juries, laymen, and attorneys view expert testi-
mony. Contra, United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963):
The Court cannot countenance the argument . . . that discovery, if permitted, will
enable property owners to "manufacture" an appraisal to take advantage of the
government's weaknesses and contradict its strength. This argument is a general
attack on the concept of discovery, not limited to this 'case, and it comes too late to
merit any consideration.
Id. at 597.
172. 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 247, at 261 (2d ed.
1953).
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report as a condition to granting discovery.'73 Discovery could be
postponed until a certain number of days before trial in order to
insure that each party will prepare his case independently.'74 A
party who does not retain an expert until it is too late for his oppo-
nent to obtain effective discovery might be precluded from calling
that expert as a witness.'75
As stated earlier, even though the expert report may fall within
the work-product immunity, production may be permitted upon a
showing of good cause.'76 Good cause may exist when the underlying
physical evidence in a suit has been damaged, disassembled,
changed or is inaccessible to the same examination by the party
seeking discovery.'77 Many courts have reasoned, therefore, that
because the property in a condemnation action is open for inspec-
tion by either party, good cause for an order requiring production
of appraisal reports does not exist.'78 This reasoning lacks one con-
sideration. An expert's thoughts and opinions are unique to him
alone. Due to the subjective nature of these opinions, the only source
of the information is from the expert himself.'79
Sufficient good cause to require production of expert reports
might be established when such discovery will uncover impeach-
ment material.'"" Good cause has also been held to be "implicit" in
173. See Nestle v. Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 928, 496 P.2d 480, 485, 101 Cal. Rptr.
568, 573 (1972).
174. See C.P.L.R. § 3140 (McKinney 1970):
[Tihe appellate division in each judicial department shall adopt rules governing the
exchange of appraisal reports intended for use at the trial in proceedings for condem-
nation ....
Pursuant to this rule, the four appellate divisions have adopted the following time limits
within which appraisal reports must be exchanged:
Appellate Division, First Judicial Dep't: 10 days
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Dep't: 10 days
Appellate Division, Third Judicial Dep't: 30 days
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Dep't: 20 days.
Buffalo v. Ives, 55 Misc. 2d 730, 286 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
175. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN.
L. REv. 455, 487 (1962).
176. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
177. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Havee, 123 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960);
State Rd. Dep't v. Shell, 122 So. 2d 215, 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), rev'd, 135 So. 2d 857
(Fla. 1961).
178. See, e.g., United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195, 197 (D.N.M. 1955).
179. See United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D, Md. 1963).
180. See Miami Transit Co. v. Hums, 46 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1950); cf. Carpenter-Tant
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condemnation litigation; since opinions and techniques are central
to the litigation, the benefits to be derived before and during trial
supply the requisite good cause to allow production.'8 ' The condem-
nor is required to obtain the property at a price which is fair to both
the public and the landowner. This requirement has been held to
constitute good cause for ordering production.'82 In adopting this
reasoning, deference was apparently given in South Carolina State
Highway Department v. Booker'83 to the fact that the condemnee is
an unwilling seller who is required to spend a considerable amount
of money in preparation for trial. Therefore, any procedure which
could shorten the trial and decrease the expenses incurred by the
condemnee should be encouraged. Such reasoning is compatible
with the purpose of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure to provide
a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of litigation.'84
The comments to Trial Rule 26 suggest that the decisions which
seek to bring expert information within the work-product doctrine
are "ill-considered."' 85 This rejection of the doctrine follows the
trend in recent cases to separate the work of an expert and that of
an attorney when discovery is sought. 86
The Doctrine of Unfairness
The third judicial limitation upon discovery is the doctrine of
unfairness. The comments to the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure
have adopted this restriction in the new provision concerning ex-
perts.' 87 The essence of the doctrine is that it would be unfair for one
party to obtain information, without expense, from an adverse
party's expert. 8 Two primary rationalizations are given for this
limitation. The first is that to permit a party to obtain the results
of work done by an adversary's expert would be equivalent to taking
Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257, 263 (D. Neb. 1959) (unless the party
can------.. tht -. h-- rcatonabic gnun* tcauf nterat 0tkltts t
in the report, it may not be produced for his inspection).
181. United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1965)
(production of reports would expedite trials and encourage out-of-court settlements); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 195 S.E.2d 615, 619 (S.C. 1973).
182. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 195 S.E.2d 615, 619 (S.C. 1973).
183. Id.
184. IND. R. Ta. P. 1.
185. HARVEY, supra note 137, at 462.
186. See, e.g., United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
187. HARVEY, supra note 137, at 462.
188. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 195 S.E.2d 615, 621 (S.C. 1973).
[Vol. 8
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property without providing compensation for it."9 An offer of com-
pensation is not a cure since it is the expert's privilege, and possibly
his duty, to refuse compensation from one party when he has ac-
cepted employment with the other.'90 This reasoning may be refuted
when it is applied to discovery of expert appraisers in a condemna-
tion action. The expert's opinions and conclusions oftentimes repre-
sent the only evidence in the case. The expert, like any ordinary
witness, cannot retain a property right in this evidence since he may
be compelled to testify at trial. 9 ' It is also the unfairness due to
surprise and concealment of evidence which necessitates the discov-
ery of all facts relevant to the issues to be litigated. In view of the
beneficial nature of discovery to both parties, unfairness conten-
tions should therefore be subordinated to the need for full and effec-
tive discovery.'92 This rationalization is also inconsistent with allow-
ing an ordinary witness to be deposed after great expense has been
incurred in locating him.'93 Finally, the expense will be minimal, or
nonexistent, if the court allows a party to obtain his opponent's
appraisal report or orders exchange of such reports.'94
The second rationalization for the unfairness doctrine is that
discovery should not be used to obtain an adverse party's trial prep-
aration material. To do so would "penalize the diligent and place a
premium on laziness."'95 The argument is that by waiting for his
189. E.g., United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98, 100 (M.D. Ga. 1955);
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
190. E.g., Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88, 89 (E.D. Pa. 1952); contra, United
States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 416 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (a hired expert in a
condemnation case has no special duty to the lawyer who hires him; rather, he has a duty to
use his expertise honestly and fairly so that justice may be accomplished; this duty tran-
scends any possible duty to his employer).
191. This reasoning does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the opposing
party has a right to compel the expert's testimony at the pre-trial stage of the case, since the
scope of discovery is much broader than the scope of testimony at trial. However, the court
does have the power to order discovery upon the condition that the moving party pay a
reasonable portion of the expert's fees. This should obviate most of the objections based upon
the unfairness doctrine. MOORE, supra note 123, 26.66[11], at 26-470.
192. See Security Indus., Inc. v. Fickus, 439 P.2d 172, 178 (Alas. 1968).
193. Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem and A Proposed FRCP Solution,
53 MINN. L. REV. 785, 798 (1969).
194. Pursuant to IND. R. TR. P. 26(B)(3)(c), the court may order that the party seeking
discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery. Since
little or no time is involved in producing a report for inspection, expenses need not be
awarded. See note 238 infra and accompanying text.
195. This view apparently originated in McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586
(E.D.N.Y. 1939), afl'd, 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940); see
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adversary to prepare a case, the lawyer could use discovery to re-
ceive the essence of that case in preparing his own.' At least in
condemnation litigation, this result is highly unlikely. Each attor-
ney must be enlightened about the merits of the case to be able to
furnish an evaluation and correct opinion to the client. Each lawyer
must also be thoroughly prepared for trial due to the technical na-
ture of the evidence to be presented and the necessity for effective
cross-examination of experts and rebuttal of their testimony. Un-
doubtedly, by the time the attorney can receive all the information
opposing counsel has obtained, it will be too late to prepare ade-
quately for trial.
Permitting discovery of an expert appraisal report when the
expert who prepared it is expected to testify at trial has been shown
to be a valuable method of making condemnation litigation more
expeditious and less confusing. Judicial limitations placed upon
discovery should not frustrate this procedure. It is submitted that
the value of production and the inapplicability of judicial limita-
tions was recognized by Indiana when the new Indiana Rules of
Trial Procedure were adopted.
THE INDIANA RULES OF TRIAL PROCEDURE
Trial Rule 26(B)(3)
In response to the problems that had been encountered with
respect to discovery of experts,'97 Indiana has adopted Trial Rule
26(B) (3):
Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
196. In answering arguments based upon the unfairness doctrine, the court in United
States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968) stated:
The burdens of discovery are equal, and it is hardly likely, as a practical matter, that
either party can rely in any substantial measure upon discovery of the other side's
app ,i ai a subsiiue for independent preparation. ...
It is undoubtedly true that no protective order can wholly eliminate the risk of
abuse without unduly hampering useful discovery. Where the opinions of experts are
central to litigation, as in condemnation cases, the irreducible risk of abuse must
simply be accepted. In the end, the central object of litigation is not to reward
diligent counsel and penalize lazy or inept counsel, but to achieve a just adjudication
of the controversy between the parties. That can be accomplished only by a full
exposure of the relevant facts.
Id. at 75.
197. The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure distinguish between experts in general and
medical experts. According to Trial Rule 35, a copy of the report of an examining physician
must be delivered to the party who was examined by court order. If the examination occurred
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(3) Trial preparation: Experts
(a) Subject to the provisions of subdivision (B)(3)(b)
of this rule and Rule 35(B), a party may discover facts
known or opinions held by an expert retained or specially
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial only upon a showing of good cause or
a showing that the party seeking discovery is unable
without undue hardship to obtain facts and opinions on the
same subject by other means or upon a showing of other
exceptional circumstances indicating that denial of discov-
ery would cause manifest injustice.
(b) As an alternative or in addition to obtaining dis-
covery under subdivision (B)(3)(a) of this rule, a party by
means of interrogatories, may require any other party
(i) to identify each person whom the other
party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, and
(ii) to state the subject-matter upon which the
expert is expected to testify.
Thereafter, any party may discover from the expert or the
other party facts known or opinions held by the expert
which are relevant to the stated subject-matter. Discovery
of the expert's opinions and the grounds therefor is re-
stricted to those previously given or those to be given on
direct examination at trial.
(c) The court may require that the party seeking dis-
covery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in
responding to discovery, and, with respect to discovery per-
mitted under subdivision (B)(3)(a) of this rule, require a
party to pay another party a fair portion of the fees and
expenses incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and
opinions from the expert.
Analysis of Trial Rule 26(B)(3)
An important aspect of this rule is that a distinction has been
drawn between experts expected to testify and those that are not.
pursuant to an agreement between the parties, provision may be made that the report need
not be delivered. However, the rule does not preclude discovery of a report compiled by the
physician, in accordance with Trial Rule 26. Therefore, Trial Rule 26 will ultimately govern
all discovery of experts.
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Only upon a showing of "good cause"'98 may a nonwitness expert be
subject to discovery procedures. No such showing is necessary with
regard to discovery from experts expected to testify.'99 There may
be legitimate reasons for such a distinction in condemnation cases.
Initially, an expert is engaged to form an opinion on damages to be
paid for the taking. This opinion will then become the basis upon
which a party determines whether settlement is feasible or advisa-
ble, or whether there is a possibility of obtaining a favorable verdict
at trial. Upon deciding that it would be beneficial to try the action,
the expert may then serve as an advisor to the attorney regarding
the preparation necessary for trial. Once the trial has begun, the
expert may also be helpful in planning trial tactics and in preparing
the attorney to handle unfamiliar data in court. °00 Up to this point,
the expert is serving as a professional consultant on the technical
and forensic aspects of his specialty. In addition to these services,
however, the expert's opinion may also be important as relevant
evidence at trial. Thus, he has a dual purpose in a condemnation
case: to serve in a nonwitness capacity and as a witness with rele-
vant evidence.20'
The fear that discovery may deter thorough trial preparation
where an expert's work is not indispensable may be the basis for the
showing of need required before discovery is allowed. °2 As the role
198. A great deal of controversy has raged over the showing necessary to satisfy this
good cause requirement. Following Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), three classes of
good cause emerged: (1) good cause needing only relevancy to the subject-matter, (2) good
cause requiring hardship or necessity, and (3) good cause, which probably could never be
shown, to allow discovery of an attorney's mental impressions. See Note, Ambiguities After
the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery of
Experts and Attorney's Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1145 (1971). The good cause referred
to in Trial Rule 26(B)(3) undoubtedly means more than mere relevance to the subject-matter
of (i he action. This fact is emphasized when the subsection states that there must be
a showing that the party seeking discovery is unable without undue hardship to
obtain facts and opinions on the same subject by other means or upon a showing of
other exceptional circumstances indicating that denial of discovery would cause
manifest injustice.
Id.
199. However, such discovery has not included the use of production of appraisal re-
ports in some Indiana lower courts. E.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank,
Cause No. 71-PSC-1161 (Porter Super. Ct., Sept. 14, 1973).
200. Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 202, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721, 726-
27 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
201. Id. at 202, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
202. Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 271, 282 (1968).
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of the expert changes to that of a prospective witness, his work
becomes essential for the presentation of pursuasive opinion testi-
mony. The threat of disclosure of this evidence will therefore not
deter trial preparation since without that evidence, an adequate
case could not be developed.
Another reason for this distinction is that until an expert is
called at trial and qualified as a witness, his opinion as to the value
of the condemned land is irrelevant.2 3 Subjecting an expert to dis-
covery where he is serving as a consultant will not perform an issue
narrowing function or clarify areas in dispute. The party seeking
discovery will not be protected from surprise or become prepared for
cross-examination or impeachment of the expert at trial.2"4 Such
reasoning led one court to deny discovery on the ground that it
would tend to confuse the issues rather than clarify them.205 Only
when the expert's initial status as a consultant changes to that of a
witness with opinion testimony do these opinions become factors in
the case to be evaluated as the testimony of other witnesses with
relevant information.20 A party should also be allowed freedom to
determine the qualifications of the expert he has hired and the
amount of work that went into formulation of the expert's opinion.
Each party is entitled to obtain the best possible evidence in sup-
port of his case without hinderance. °7
203. Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 203, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721, 727
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964); contra, United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 75 (9th Cir. 1968) (such
logic would preclude discovery from anyone, as well as experts, since admissibility of evidence
and competency of witnesses may always be raised at trial).
204. Cf. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968) (discovery of expert
witness allowed in spite of this argument).
205. Riddle Spring Realty Co. v. State, 107 N.H. 271, 278, 220 A.2d 751, 758 (1966).
206. Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 203, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721, 727
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
207. The court in United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968), found little
justification for any distinction between expert witnesses and nonwitnesses. Even though
discovery of nonwitness experts will not narrow any issues, avoid surprise, and prepare an
attorney for cross-examination, these experts may have discovered facts, applied techniques,
or arrived at opinions which are relevant and helpful to the discoverying party. Id. at 76.
Apparently viewing suppression of unfavorable evidence as the only reason that the govern-
ment would not call the expert to testify, the court stated that this would be an "intolerable"
situation. Id. at 76. A rule denying discovery simply because an opponent reached a witness
first and paid for his services would be inconsistent with the purposes of discovery. Id. at 76.
It is submitted that such a distinction between expert witnesses and nonwitnesses has
little practical relevance in a condemnation action. Generally, an expert hired to assist with
trial preparation is also hired to perform the function of a witness at trial.
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Showing of Need and the Testifying Expert
The question remains whether discovery of appraisal reports
prepared by experts expected to be called at trial is permitted with-
out any requisite showing of need. A close examination of Trial Rule
26 suggests that the answer to this question is in the affirmative.
Trial Rule 26(A) provides that a party may obtain discovery by
production of documents. °0 Trial Rule 26(B)(3)(b) states that fol-
lowing the use of interrogatories "any party may discover from the
expert or the other party facts known or opinions held by the expert
which are relevant to the stated subject-matter.""2 9 Since discovery
includes production of documents, it follows that the above provi-
sion includes production of appraisal reports. °10 Trial Rule 34 has
eliminated the requirement of a good cause showing prior to an
order for production of documents. "' Rather, good cause has been
transferred to the two sections of Trial Rule 26 dealing with trial
preparation material and with experts used in preparation for
trial. 22 It is submitted that good cause is not a requirement in Trial
Rule 26(B)(3)(b). The words "good cause" are conspicuously absent
from (B)(3)(b) while they are specifically placed in (B)(2) and
(B)(3)(a). Reference need not be taken at all to (B)(2) and (B)(3)(a)
good cause when dealing with experts expected to testify. Trial Rule
26(B)(2) states in its initial sentence that its provisions are "subject
to the provisions of subdivision (B) . . .(3) . . . ." Therefore, refer-
ence must be had to the provisions of (B)(3) before the provisions
of (B)(2) are considered. But (B)(3)(a) also states that its provisions
are subject to those in subdivision (B)(3)(b). Thus, (B)(3)(b) must
be read before (B)(3)(a) is considered. Reading (B)(3)(b) alone, be-
fore (B)(2) and (B)(3)(a), discovery may be undertaken without any
requisite showing of need. The only requirements to be met before
208. IND. R. TR. P. 26(A)(3) provides:
(A) Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the follow-
ing met hods:
(3) production of documents ....
209. IND. R. TR. P. 26(B)(3)(b) (emphasis added).
210. IND. R. TR. P. 34(A)(1) states that production of documents is within the scope of
Trial Rule 26(B).
211. Because Trial Rule 26 now requires a good cause showing prior to the allowance of
discovery, there was no need for good cause to remain a requirement in Trial Rule 34. See
4A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 34.08, at 34-83 (2d ed. 1972).
212. IND. R. Ta. P. 26(B)(2) & (3)(a).
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production of the reports may be ordered are as follows: the reports
must be relevant to the subject-matter involved in the pending
litigation,"' they must not be privileged" 4 and the "opinions and
grounds therefor" which are contained within the reports must have
been "previously given" or must be intended to be given on direct
examination at trial.
215
The first requirement, relevancy to the subject-matter, does not
raise any problems when production of appraisal reports is sought.
An appraisal report is made for one purpose-to show the expert
appraiser's opinions and underlying factual data relied upon in de-
termining the amount of just compensation the expert believes
should be paid to the condemnee. Clearly, the contents of these
reports are relevant and material to the issues involved.2 16 Privilege,
the second requirement, is privilege as it exists in the law of evi-
dence. 27 The privilege immunizing appraisal reports from discovery
would be the privilege of communications between attorney and
client.2 8 As discussed earlier, case law has generally rejected the
attorney-client privilege as a prohibition of discovery from ex-
perts. 9
The final requirement is a new addition to Trial Rule 26. Com-
mentators have suggested that this provision is somewhat unclear,22
but there should be no difficulty with this provision when condem-
nation litigation is involved. Opinions to be given upon direct exam-
ination at trial will be determined from the party's response to an
interrogatory concerning the subject-matter of the expert's expected
testimony. These opinions will be on just compensation for the prop-
213. Id. at 26(B)(1).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 26(B)(3)(b).
216. E.g., United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952):
There can be no question as to the relevancy of the [appraisal reports], as they
bear directly on the question of just compensation for the land involved in the
condemnation action. Admissibility in evidence is not a prerequisite to the right to
discovery and inspection under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 21.
217. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 229 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
218. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 195 S.E.2d 615, 619 (S.C. 1973).
219. See notes 143-56 supra and accompanying text.
220. Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 271, 282-83 (1968); Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem and A Proposed
FRCP Solution, 53 MINN. L. REV. 785, 803-04 (1969). These authors suggest the difficulty
stems from the use of the words "those previously given."
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erty being condemned and will be contained in the appraisal report.
Therefore, production of these reports will necessarily concern "the
expert's opinions and grounds therefor . . .to be given on direct
examination at trial. 22'
The breadth of these new provisions was recognized in In re
Appropriation of Property of Maiden 2 where the court sustained a
motion for discovery of the identity of expert witnesses, the
subject-matter upon which the experts were to testify, the names
of' persons who had inspected the property involved, the dates of
inspection and all appraisal reports. In allowing such discovery,
the court pointed out:
In appropriation cases full pretrial disclosure of expert wit-
nesses, appraisers' opinions and the details upon which
they are based is required if the Ohio Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are to accomplish their purpose. . . .The testimony
of appraisers is the crux of the trial and full disclosure of
their opinions and the foundation upon which they rest are
essential to adequate litigation, subject to the court's power
to control the timing, scope and other protective steps. 23
Comparison with Federal Rule 26
One note of caution must be given. Indiana has adopted Trial
Rule 26 as taken from the 1967 Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts. 24
Federal Rule 26, as it presently exists, 25 is much different in scope
221. It has been suggested that discovery of opinions "previously given" should be
interpreted as discovery of opinions "previously given ... on direct examination at trial" or
opinions volunteered by an expert during the course of discovery. Note, Proposed 1967
Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUM. L, REv. 271, 283 (1968).
222. 26 Ohio Misc. 19, 268 N.E.2d 824 (C.P., Lorain County 1970).
224. HARVEY, supra note 137, at 457.
225. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(B)(4) provides:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b) (1) of this rule
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained
only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state
the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the sub-
stance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a
summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order
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than Indiana Trial Rule 26. Federal Rule 26(B)(4) recites that "dis-
covery of facts known and opinions held by experts . . . may be
obtained only as follows . . ."."I" This wording is indicative of the
restrictive nature of the rule. Subdivision (b)(4)(A)(i) of Federal
Rule 26 then provides that interrogatories may be utilized to iden-
tify a party's expert witness and to obtain the subject-matter upon
which he is expected to testify. This provision is identical to Indiana
Trial Rule 26(B)(3)(b)(i) and (ii). However, the Federal Rule con-
tinues by stating that the interrogatory may also seek the substance
of facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify. Only
upon motion to the court may further discovery be ordered.
Federal courts construing the new rule have been relatively
strict about allowing further discovery beyond the use of interroga-
tories.27 Most courts have interpreted (b)(4)(ii) as requiring a show-
ing of exceptional circumstances before production of expert reports
would be permitted, apparently using 26(b)(3) in supplying this
requirement."' The Indiana Rules should not be interpreted in this
manner. A motion for further discovery need not be made to the
court under Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(3)(b) subsequent to the initial
further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such
provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b) (4) (C) of this rule, concerning fees and
expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only
as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions
on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding
to discovery under subdivisions (b) (4) (A) (ii) and (b) (4) (B) of this rule; and (ii)
with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b) (4) (A) (ii) of this rule the
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b) (4)
(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party
in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(B)(4) (emphasis added).
227. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 205 (N.D. Miss. 1972) ((4)(A)(i)
does not envisage production of reports on which expert opinions professedly rely); United
States v. 145.31 Acres of Land, 54 F.R.D. 359, 360 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (party not entitled to an
al)praisal report as a matter of course); Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(compelling )roduction of documents containing an expert's opinion on the mere allegation
that answers to interrogatories were insufficient would defeat the entire process which
26())(4) sets forth).
228. See cases cited note 227 supra.
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use of an interrogatory. As discussed earlier, a good cause showing
is no longer requisite in obtaining documents pursuant to Trial Rule
34 and the correct construction of Trial Rule 26(B)(3)(b) reveals
that appraisal reports are now freely discoverable without a demon-
stration of need.2
Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(3)(b) also gives a party the discretion
to decide which method of discovery is best suited to his particular
circumstances. Federal Rule 26(b)(4) limits a party to the use of
interrogatories to obtain the substance of facts known and opinions
held by the expert, while in Indiana, the party may use any discov-
ery procedure to obtain this information. Evidence of a change in
scope from the 1967 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
and the 1970 Rules, as adopted in the federal courts, may also be
found in the Federal Advisory Committee's Notes. In the 1967 Pro-
posed Amendments,n ° under an example of the power of the court
to curb abuses of discovery, a statement was made that if "an ex-
pert's written report affords the opposing party an adequate basis
upon which to prepare his cross-examination and rebuttal, the court
may prohibit a deposition." '' This example has been omitted from
the comments to the Federal Rules as adopted in 1970.
Protective Orders
Abuses may become apparent when discovery of appraisal re-
ports is sought which will necessitate a protective court order. For
example, if it is shown that a party seeking production has not
retained an expert, it could be argued that production should be
denied. Difficulties might be encountered if after production of the
report, the discovered party employs a new expert whose report is
not given to the moving party. Or, a remedy might be necessary
229. See notes 208-13 supra and accompanying text.
Comments were taken from the Federal Advisory Committee's Notes. HARVEY, supra note
137, at 457.
231. Id. at 464. An attempt may be made to read this example as stating that if the
party's own expert report forms an adequate basis upon which to prepare cross-examination
and rebuttal, that party may be precluded from taking a deposition of his opponent's expert.
Any such interpretation would be erroneous. After this example, reference is made to MD. R.
PROC. 410(c)(2). This rule requires a party to produce a report prepared by his expert witness
for the opposing party's inspection. Should a report not be available, the expert may be
deposed. By referring to the Maryland Rule, it is clear the intent of the example is to allow
discovery of the adversary's expert report prior to any depositions.
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should one party determine he has only received a partial report
from his opponent.
There is little reason for denying discovery when a expert has
not been retained for use at trial by the moving party."2 Without
the services of an expert, establishing a value for the property being
condemned might be troublesome.2 3 It is doubtful that by saving
the expense of an expert and relying upon discovery of the oppo-
nent's expert, an effective case could be presented to the trier of
fact. However, should the moving party suddenly hire an expert
immediately before trial, the court might consider two options. A
continuance may be granted for the opponent to examine the ex-
pected testimony of the expert,234 or use of the expert at trial might
be forbidden.235 The second option should be adopted where the
delay in hiring the expert was an intentional circumvention of the
discovery rules.26
Upon receiving an appraisal report from his opponent, should
the party determine that the report is only a partial one, he might
obtain a court order for the remainder of the report if it has been
reduced to writing. If the party does not realize he has been "short-
changed" until trial, some courts have sustained a motion to strike
any testimony not contained within the report. 237
Further protective measures are provided in subsection
(B)(3)(c) of Trial Rule 26 which authorizes the sharing of expenses.
This subsection is a response to the doctrine of unfairness. Here
232. No requirement is in existence which forces a party to retain the services of an
appraiser or incur the expense of an appraisal report. See Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231
Cal. App. 2d 195, 201, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721, 725 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); State v. Reid, 204 Ind.
631, 642, 185 N.E. 449, 453 (1933).
23:1. See note 170 supra. Where one party has not retained an expert, and is seeking to
obtain his adversary's expert report, the court might order a sharing of costs. See note 238
infra and accompanying text.
234. See generally Jensen v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., __ Ind __, 277 N.E.2d 589,
590 (1972).
235. See Nestle v. Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 928-29 n.5, 496 P.2d 480, 485 n.5, 101
Cal. Rptr. 568, 573 n.5 (1972).
2:36. Indiana Trial Rule 26(E)(1)(b) provides that a party is under a duty to seasonably
supplement his response to a question addressed to "the identity of each person expected to
be called as an expert witness at trial and the subject-matter on which he is expected to
testify. Since parties are put on notice regarding this obligation, Indiana courts should not
hesitate to utilize this option.
237. E.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Morris, 266 Cal. App. 2d 616, 630, 72 Cal. Rptr.
406, 414 (1968).
1974]
et al.: Condemnation in Indiana: Discovery of Expert Appraisal Reports
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
452 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
again, the distinction between experts expected to be called as wit-
nesses at trial and those utilized in preparation for trial is recog-
nized. Only when discovery of the latter is involved may the court
require payment by the party seeking discovery of a fair portion of
the expert's fees and expenses incurred in gathering market data
and in formulating opinions. Where discovery is sought from an
expert expected to be called as a witness at trial, a reasonable fee
for the time spent by the expert in responding to discovery need only
be required. Since an exchange of appraisal reports involves little
or no time for the expert, there should be no reason for the payment
of such fees.2"'
CONCLUSION
For a party to effectively prepare for condemnation litigation,
the ability to discover facts and opinions from the adversary's expert
may be crucial. Such discovery should be encouraged for a number
of reasons. The wide disparity common among appraisals compiled
by valuation experts might diminish as each party realizes an ap-
praisal which is difficult to support may be damaging to his case
when his opponent can scrutinize the appraisal's validity. The ex-
pense of pretrial discovery will be reduced. Settlement prior to trial
will be encouraged as unrealistic claims are re-evaluated or
dropped. The trial itself may be shortened or simplified as the issues
to be tried are limited. Concealment of evidence and surprise when
such evidence is produced at trial will be minimized. Each party
will ultimately be benefited through a more complete preparation
for cross-examination and rebuttal. Yet such discovery should not
lead to a decrease in trial preparation by either party because of the
necessity for thorough pretrial research.
In view of these benefits, judicial limitations upon discovery
should be circumvented or denied applicability. The danger of
abuse of discovery that necessitated the formulation of these limita-
tions may be sufficiently avoided by the court's power to issue pro-
tective orders. However, a burden is also placed upon each party to
cooperate throughout the discovery process. An uncooperative atti-
tude may lead to many results which a liberal discovery procedure
attempts to prevent. Constant need to obtain a court order to com-
238. The court should, however, exercise its discretion in awarding expenses to the
expert expected to testify when the moving party has not retained an expert.
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pel full discovery causes delay and expense. Further, conflicts de-
veloping during discovery may impede the atmosphere necessary for
a discussion of settlement.
Indiana courts should read Trial Rule 26 in the manner in
which it should be interpreted-the allowance of full discovery from
experts expected to testify at trial. When new ideas which would
result in beneficial changes are developed, courts should not be
resistent.3 9 The acceptance of this change may help to fulfill the
requirement of just compensation in a manner which will be fairer
to both the condemnee and condemnor.
239. See United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark. 1962), where
the court, for the first time in twenty years, was faced with a motion by a condemnee for
production of appraisal reports. Calling such discovery an "innovation," the court sustained
the condemnor's objections to the motion. Id. at 521.
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